Serbia | 12/31/2021

Serbia 2021 December

Key developments


Summarizing the activities of the far-right parties of the movement and organizations in the previous year, we come to several conclusions.

First, a new network of far-right organizations was constituted, which is specified in relation to the previous ones. First, it is not tied to the state structures, nor is it in favour of Russia. On the contrary, Ukraine has become a new center of gathering and financing. Robert Rundo, with his influence and connections in the Azov Battalion and their funds. He was cruised across the Balkans and Central Europe and managed to establish this network in Serbia, consisting of mostly younger activists who may be known to the police but did not play a special role on the far right so far. He managed to use the smoldering conflict between the two currents, which was not related to whether they are in favor of Russia or Ukraine, but more generation gap conflict, and now the far right is divided into pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian part. The Russian part of the scene is still much bigger and numerically stronger because it is connected with certain parts of the government and instructed from that side and relatively well financed. That part of the scene consists of the “Leviathan National Defense” Which started as an organization who protect animal right , the Serbian organization Zavetnici, the Serbian Right and the People’s Patrols. There are organizations that are not under the direct control of the regime, but are indirectly connected with pro-Russian interests and capital. On the other hand, there is the network of Robert Rundo, which is connected with the Ukrainian battalion Azov and their finances. It is seemingly more vital and autonomous in actions. It does not serve the regime as an infantry on the street. Finally, there are the remnants of the former subcultural neo-Nazi scene embodied in organizations such as Blood and Honor United Force and MC Serbs.

None of these organizations has managed to put itself at the head of the anti-wax movement, and the regime seems to control it well. None of them does not have a great force in terms of numbers, except perhaps the DVERI that have about 5,000 members in Serbia, but their policy is less focused on the street and violence and more on parliament, which does not mean that they are not dangerous.

Differentiation on the far right is almost complete and we have to follow their work. The relative growth and expansion they experienced in the first half of the year was stifled by state actions (expulsion of the Rundo) and anti-fascists actions against them, the absolute absence of an alternative on the left and the economic crisis and the ensuing information resulting from a two-year pandemic lead to growing dissatisfaction and perhaps turning part of the population to the extreme solutions they offer. The emergence of the Erasmus Foundation and the funding of clerical and far-right policies and DVERI movement projects will certainly help the extreme right in Serbia to have a greater impact.